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Prenatal counselling and associated tests have become routine parts of prenatal care in 
many countries (Reid, 1990). The main intentions are to offer women the choice about 
whether to continue with a pregnancy when a fetus is impaired, and to contribute to 
reducing the incidence of disability with its attendant distresses and costs (HTA, 
1998). This chapter reviews contrasting views about prenatal counselling, its 
advantages and disadvantages. Medical and counselling images of disability are 
compared with the views of adults who have conditions which are tested for 
prenatally. The evidence poses questions for bioethical reflection about the nature of 
disability (is it mainly physical impairment or social restrictions?) and about the 
possible impact of prenatal screening and counselling on maternal-fetal relationships.  
These questions include not only personal, mother-child relationships, but also the 
way that parenting generally, like pregnancy, may be becoming tentative and 
provisional, instead of unconditional acceptance of  the child as a’a gift of God’: 
common in traditional rhetoric, at least, if not in practice. 
 
Prenatal counselling  
 
Prenatal testing and counselling have expanded since prenatal diagnosis of Down’s 
syndrome, thalassaemia and sickle cell anaemia disease began through amniocentesis 
in the late 1960s. Chorionic villus sampling (cvs), another diagnostic test which also 
draws fetal material from within the maternal abdomen, has since been developed. 
There are now two further and less invasive methods, which examine either serum 
from maternal blood tests or else, from about 12-15 weeks gestation, nuchal 
translucency (swelling in the fetal neck) by ultrasound scanning,. Both these tests can 
indicate higher risks of the fetus having a chromosomal disorder or spina bifida (Wald 
et al, 1992) and increasingly serum screening and ultrasound scanning are routinely 
offered in wealthier countries. In Britain, in areas with many members of ethnic 
minority groups affected by sickle cell anaemia or thalassaemia, universal prenatal 
screening for these conditions has been implemented or proposed. The monogenetic 
condition most likely to affect Caucasians, cystic fibrosis, is not yet routinely screened 
for, but, as with other monogenetic conditions, prenatal tests are often offered to 
families known to be affected. The tests may be preceded or followed by counselling, 
which ranges from giving medical results to detailed discussion about the nature and 
meaning of the tests, the results and the possible choices they offer (Green and 
Statham, 1996; Marteau et al., 1988). 
 There is a crucial difference in knowledge of the condition being tested for between 
people with an affected close relative who have personal experience and who opt-in to 
have prenatal tests, and the `healthy’ unaffected majority of pregnant women who are 
routinely screened unless they opt-out. The latter group is likely to need much more 
counselling before being able to make an informed choice about whether to have a 
test. Yet because personal opt-in testing involves far fewer people and tends to be 
done by clinical geneticists, whereas mass screening involves far more people and is 
done by generalist prenatal staff, the latter group usually receive much less 
counselling (Clarke, 1994, 1997).  
  
  Prenatal counselling can begin  before conception, when people in a `high risk’ 
group or family are tested for their carrier status of single gene conditions. The same 
tests during pregnancy indicate, if both parents are carriers, that the fetus could be a 
carrier or have the full condition. So a positive result leads on to decisions about 
whether to have the more invasive definitive tests of amniocentesis or cvs, and 
whether to continue with the pregnancy. 
 
Advantages of prenatal counselling  
 
Advocates of universal prenatal screening and counselling say that the services offer 
every woman information and opportunities to choose. Preconceptual tests for carrier 
status may influence decisions about choosing a partner and becoming a parent. With 
fetal tests, parents may be more accepting of an impaired child if they are able to 
prepare emotionally before the birth, and are also able to feel that they chose to have 
the child rather than feeling imposed upon. Termination of affected pregnancies 
obviates the emotional, practical and financial costs of supporting disabled children, 
and also prevents the suffering which the child and family would otherwise endure. 
`Therapeutic termination’ is usually cited as the `effective remedy’ which validates 
screening programmes (HTA, 1998). Decades of preconceptual and prenatal screening 
in Cyprus have contained the costs of treating thalassaemia which would otherwise 
have overwhelmed the national budget (Modell and Kuliev, 1993).  
 
Fetal tests and prenatal selection now enable women from families with a known 
severe genetic disorder to have healthy children, whereas previously they could only 
choose between either the risk of having an impaired child or else remaining childless. 
Efficient screening programmes involve the kinds of scientific and statistical 
knowledge which raise standards in evidence-based health services (Thornton, 1994) 
and also raise standards and the status of the nursing, midwifery and counselling 
professions (Sigmon et al., 1997).  
 
The prenatal literature, confirmed by our research observations (see 
Acknowledgements), tends to emphasise the burdens of having an impaired child. For 
example, Professor Lilford calculates a net gain to society of screening 100,000 
pregnancies, involving 3,000 amniocentesis (2,960 with negative results) incurring the 
inadvertent miscarriage of 30 unaffected fetuses, in order to reduce the incidence of 
Down’s syndrome from 100 to 60 live births (Painton, 1997). He considers the costs 
are justified by the severity of Down’s syndrome. There is frequent mention of `risk’, 
`handicap’, `mental retardation’, `bad/faulty/dangerous gene’, `problem’, `trouble’ 
and`suffering’ (see review by, for example, Shakespeare, 1999). Pathology tends to be 
stressed,  rather than the unpredictable range from very mild to very severe . For 
example, a paper in a leading medical peer-reviewed journal begins, `Spina bifida 
occurs in one of 2,000 births and leads to life long and devastating physical 
disabilities including paraplegia, hydrocephalus, incontinence, sexual dysfunction, 
skeletal deformities and mental impairment.’( Scott et al., 1998) `Including’ could 
imply that all cases with spina bifida have these and other defects, although the 
accurate meaning would be `may include’; some people with spina bifida have none 
of these problems. However, by implication, the greater the costs of disability, then 
the greater the benefits of prenatal prevention.  
Universal screening and counselling are guided by principles of respect for 
prospective parents’ autonomy, the justice of fair distribution and cost containment, 
and the beneficence of preventing suffering and promoting scientific public health and 
other health services, as well as by reasoned utilitarian values (Bromham, Dalton and 
Jackson, 1990; Ettorre, 1999). The intention is to promote healthier and happier 
maternal-fetal and subsequent mother-child relationships. 
 
Disadvantages of prenatal counselling   
 
 
Concerns about prenatal testing and counselling range from the effects on individuals 
to broader social effects. Screening of large populations raises unnecessary anxiety 
among the vast majority of women whose pregnancies are `normal’, although many 
have to go through anxious waiting for ominous screening results to be clarified 
(Green, Statham and Snowden, 1994). Frequently, women are screened without their 
full knowledge or consent  (Green, 1994; Marteau, 1995). Prenatal counselling 
services tend to be under-resourced and fall below recommended standards, so despite 
their best efforts staff seldom have enough time to counsel well (Clarke, 1994; Smith, 
Shaw and Marteau, 1994). The diagnostic fetal tests are risky. Amniocentesis and cvs 
each incur a one per cent risk of miscarriage, and some clinics warn that autopsies 
after termination find on average that one fetus in every 200 is `normal’ after a false 
positive result (KCH, 1999). False positive and false negative results are further 
complicated when risks and reassurance are misunderstood, and are reduced to 
statistical terms which confuse many women - and also many prenatal counsellors 
(Sadler, 1997; HTA, 1998). Pregnancy is being transformed from a healthy `natural’ 
experience into a pathological `tentative’ state in which women are increasingly 
bound by medical opinion, invasive surveillance and `manufactured uncertainty’ 
(Rothman, 1994, 1998). Despite being intended to prevent suffering, termination of 
pregnancy for fetal abnormality can cause intense distress and regret (Green and 
Statham, 1996; Santalahti, 1998). 
  
New reproductive technologies align with other current trends, such as risk 
management, consumerism and economic pressures (Beck 1992; Winkler, 1998) to 
encourage women to expect to have f a `perfect’ baby, closer to a consumer 
commodity than a valued person with ordinary human failings. Some analysts see 
these trends as undermining the status and value of children (O’Neill, 1994; Brazier, 
1996), others criticise them as `feto-centric’ (Rothman, 1996:26). Either way, there is 
a growing tendency to set the interests and rights of mother and fetus in opposition, as 
illustrated by Bromham et al. (1990). This conflict has been critically analysed by 
Callahan and Knight (1992) who show how, in cases of enforced Caesareans in the 
US, fetal distress has tended to be linked to maternal disadvantage. Better living 
standards and health care could benefit both mother and fetus, preventing occasions 
for conflicts of interests. Women who escaped from having enforced surgery tended to 
give birth normally, so questioning the medical expertise on which fetal rights 
arguments are based.  
While women’s lives are complicated by pregnancy, many women welcome 
pregnancy as personally fulfilling and status-enhancing - as demonstrated by the 
demand for infertility services. Yet during recent decades, universal prenatal screening 
has encouraged a tendency towards treating every pregnancy, however greatly desired, 
as provisional, creating a culture of `Do you really want it? Take it or leave it.’ The 
technologies contribute towards accentuating conflicts between maternal and fetal 
interests through their ability to scan and screen the fetus as a separate identity, and 
their emphasis on `abnormality’. Decisions about `therapeutic’ abortion are treated as 
medically informed technical choices about `handicap’ rather than as moral decisions 
which profoundly affect human relationships, identity and obligations, and the 
meaning of parenthood as an unconditional or else a provisional relationship.   
 
Further concerns include the following questions. Are women truly informed and 
respected, or are the choices they are asked to make illusory, overly constrained by 
economic and social pressures, or unwanted burdens for women who would prefer not 
to know or to choose? Economically, could the considerable funds and resources 
devoted to prenatal screening be used more effectively to prevent and treat disease and 
disability, which are far more commonly acquired than innate? (Oliver, 1996). How 
scientific can prenatal counselling be, given high rates of false positive and false 
negative results of initial screening, and the inability to assess how severely affected a 
fetus is, with the unknown impact of the potential child’s future lifestyle?Although 
opt-in individual testing at the request of women who have affected relatives with a 
genetic condition is beneficial, there is a strong case for showing that  mass prenatal 
screening causes more harm than good (Clarke, 1997).  
 
Disabled people’s perspectives 
 
The pros and cons listed so far can all be based on mainstream medical and moral 
assumptions: that health and independent personal fulfilment are the highest goods; 
that it is therefore right to prevent and avoid illness and disability, to the extent of 
preventing disabled lives; that such lives inevitably will be costly, dependent lives of 
suffering; and that it is kind and responsible to the potential person and to the family, 
especially the mother, to relieve them of these burdens. 
 
Yet these assumptions raise questions. What do disabled people think about the 
images of disability publicized by the screening services, and their effects on human 
relationships? Is life with the screened-for conditions inevitably so seriously impaired, 
dependent, sad and unproductive? What do people who live with these conditions 
think about the value and quality of their life and about prenatal screening? How do 
they feel when close relatives consider having an abortion of a fetus with their 
condition? The next two sections consider these questions, beginning with the 
activists’ views.  
 
Radical views of disabled people  
 
Disability activists contrast the term `people with a disability or handicap’ with that of 
`disabled people’ (Oliver, 1996; Asch, 1999; Asch, 2000). They argue that the former 
phrase emphasises a deficit in the person, and the latter term denotes how they are 
disabled more by an uncaring society than by any impairment or learning difficulty 
(Goodey, 1991; Ward, 1997) they may have. Oliver, a professor who uses a 
wheelchair, argues that his mobility is limited by the poor design of local buses rather 
than by his physical state. Disability activists claim equal civil rights, access and 
opportunities with everyone else, and they oppose the discriminatory language of 
`special need’. They criticise the medicalization of disability, saying that they wish to 
be treated by doctors when they are ill or injured or have a condition which can be 
cured or palliated, but not otherwise. Many disabilities are not susceptible to any 
medical treatment and, according to the activists, in cases when doctors cannot do 
good they can do harm, both to the individual and more generally by pathologizing 
disabilities. With other critical researchers, they challenge geneticization ( Lippman, 
1991), its eugenic tendencies (Paul, 1992) and its fatalistic reductionism to genetic 
influences and away from social influences and human agency (Rose, 1995). 
Language blurs thought in general policies and individual practices. As Steinberg 
(1997:117) notes, talk of `an “offending gene” implicitly bespeaks an “offensive 
person”’.  
 
Shakespeare (1999) reviews openly eugenic and influential medical comments about 
screening services. Yet he asks whether both medical and activist images of disability 
are not `losing the plot’. Perhaps they are equally extreme, one exaggerating 
pathologies, the other over-denying them, and neither attending to the lived realities of 
people’s daily lives which, Lippman (1994) urges, should be examined carefully. 
Issues include women making responsible prenatal decisions, the goodwill of the staff 
who work with them, and the diverse and expert but little-known views of disabled 
people. Shakespeare tries to steer a middle course between the polarities of denial of 
the limitations of very severe disability, on the one hand, or else fearful pity and dread 
about very severe disability, on the other. Interviews to be described later consider 
how disabled people work between these polarities in their everyday realities. 
 
Attempts to analyse maternal-fetal relations and prenatal decisions are trapped in 
another powerfully dismissive demarcation: pro-life versus pro-choice. All discussion 
is too easily assigned to one side or the other, with superficial approval or rejection. 
Yet decisions about a greatly desired though impaired pregnancy illuminate the 
complications in right-to-life arguments versus women’s actual right to choose freely 
when they want neither available option – neither a severely impaired child nor an 
abortion.  
 
Disabled feminists and other feminists discuss this middle ground (Degner, 1990; 
Morris, 1991; Asch, 1999; Asch, 2000). Crow (1996, p.208) says they should 
acknowledge that impairment, instead of being `irrelevant, neutral and sometimes 
positive’, really is a `quandary’ of `contradictions and complexities’. Ramazanoglu 
(1989) argues that feminist research is a matter of examining and holding together 
contradictions instead of futile attempts to ignore or resolve them superficially, and 
this links to concepts of `maternal holding on’ watching and waiting (Ruddick, 1990; 
Adams, 1995) in contrast to `masculinist’ decisive rapid intervention which prenatal 
counselling tends to facilitate. The next section reviews a few of the responses of 
disabled people during our research interviews.   
 
Research with disabled people 
 
During a European project (see Acknowledgements) researchers investigated the 
views on prenatal screening of physicians, midwives, pregnant women, the general 
public, experts and reports in the mass media and professional journals. A small study 
also obtained the views of adults who have a condition which is screened or tested for 
prenatally. In the UK, we interviewed 40 people, ten each with cystic fibrosis (CF), 
sickle cell anaemia or thalassaemia and five each with Down’s syndrome or spina 
bifida.  
Two aspects of the interviews provided information relevant to prenatal screening. 
The first, through general questions about their family and friends, education and 
work, problems, enjoyments and aims, built up a picture of interviewees’ views on the 
quality and value, and the possible suffering and costly dependence of their lives. The 
second aspect was to ask interviewees directly for their views about being or 
becoming parents themselves and about prenatal screening choices. Did they agree 
with the assumption underlying screening policies that it is reasonable and perhaps 
preferable to prevent lives such as theirs?  
 
Before reviewing some of the replies, a note about research method is necessary. As 
reviews of Medline and other website data-sets show, the medical literature on these 
conditions is mainly drawn from medical records and research about associated 
pathology, and from quantitative psychological surveys of anxiety, depression, 
intelligence and quality of life. The research relies on standardized questionnaires 
which measure levels of difficulty. Researchers use a slightly impersonal `objective’ 
manner in order to be fair and to elicit comparable replies from everyone. They focus 
on disability, asking questions such as `How does your illness affect your daily life?’ 
rather than considering other possible factors.  
 
In contrast, we used qualitative methods, a less formal interview style, and  open 
questions asking for detailed replies;we looked for variety instead of measuring 
common factors. We contacted small groups of people through informal networks in 
order, we hoped, to avoid seeming perhaps intimidatingly professional, and to stress 
that we saw them as persons rather than patients. For terms such as `patient’, `disease’  
and `suffering’, we substituted the more neutral ones of `person’, `condition’  and 
`experience’. With each potentially negative question about problems or difficulties, 
we also asked a positive one about rewards and successes. Everyone was sent a leaflet 
before they agreed to take part about the topics we would raise, and about their rights: 
to consent or refuse, to withdraw or withhold information, and to maintain 
confidentiality. We were worried at first about whether we should risk asking 
questions which might be painfully probing, but we were soon reassured by the 
responses; almost everyone talked calmly and frankly as if they were used to 
discussing issues such as screening for their condition. Most taped interviews lasted 
about an hour; towards the end we said that, although we would like to use all the 
detail which interviewees had supplied in our reports, we would have to select and 
summarize their comments for published papers. We asked interviewees to help us to 
complete summary sheets, noting their key responses to each main topic in a few 
sentences. This worked very well, as the previous discussion had helped to order and 
clarify their views, and the sheets gave them some editorial control over how we 
would use their views.  
 
In contrast to mainstream medical and psychological traditions, our approach, 
methods and language yield different and, we would argue, more realistic insights into 
the daily lives of people with serious congenital conditions. Table 1 summarizes the 
background detail of the numbers of men and women interviewed, their ages, 
education, employment and households. Cohabitation was higher than shown in the 
table because some had formerly lived with partners. Table 1 shows that most of 
interviewees contribute, now or in the past,  by doing paid work instead of incurring 
the `lifetime costs of care’ which are used in some calculations to show that prenatal  
screening is cost-effective (Wald, 1992). All the interviewees are literate and 
numerate: two groups are highly educated, five people with CF had been to university 
and two more planned to go there. The groups also did a great deal of voluntary work. 
Among the people with Down’s syndrome, for example, one helped to run a youth 
club, one taught on courses about empowerment, assertion and safe sex for people 
with learning difficulties and was an artist, and two were actors who shared in creating 
plays about disability and genetics. All the interviewees related a wide range of 
activities which they enjoyed doing.  
 
This is not to claim that these interviewees are representative. Too little social 
research has been conducted to discover what a representative group with, say, sickle 
cell anaemia would be like. Qualitative research such as this study cannot produce 
measurable, generalisable findings about the abilities and experiences of these five 
groups of people. Yet the study can challenge general assumptions, by showing how  
these interviewees did not fit the negative images propounded in the prenatal medical 
literature. To give a flavour of the interviews, the next sections will describe a few of 
them. 
 
Examples from the interviews  
 
To give an example of the informality, my first interview about cystic fibrosis was 
with Tim, aged 23 (names have been changed). I was worried when he showed me 
into the family living room where his sister and girl friend were already sitting, as I 
expected that their presence would inhibit him. I avoid the standard research practice 
of asking families to regroup to allow for a private interview, partly because their 
decisions and family dynamics are such useful data, partly because I would assert a 
potentially inhibiting power balance. The point of meeting at their home or other place 
of their choice is to respect their status: they are the experts who are helping me. Tim 
could have arranged a private meeting if he had wanted to. During the interview he 
spoke about his shorter life expectancy, and when the young women objected he said 
that they always avoided the subject, but he wanted to talk about it with them. I was 
pleased that he seemed to use the interview for his own purposes, and their presence 
was a spur to talk rather than a constraint. Tim worked as a retail manager, and used 
his days off to attend hospital. Like other interviewees he tried to make his 
employment record at least as good as that of his colleagues, to prevent his condition 
being used as an excuse to dismiss him. In common with other people his age, Tim 
longed to earn enough to live with his girlfriend and leave his parents’ home. Like 
many of the interviewees, when asked about his hopes and aims, Tim spoke freely 
about being a partner and becoming a parent, spontaneously raising these issues and 
relieving me of the worry that I might upset or embarrass him by introducing them. 
 
 Some of the people with CF had successful careers. Jane was delighted to return to 
work and to caring fully for her family after her recent heart transplant, but others 
were frustrated at not being able to find suitable work. They found it hard to live on 
benefits in cold damp homes, unsuitable for their lungs. Life expectancy for many 
people with CF is now over 40, but they felt that out-dated images of the sickly child 
who dies young are still too prominent and deter employers from accepting them.  
 
To illustrate the range of people, the most disabled person with CF was Jenny aged 
24, who wished that she could use her English degree to be a journalist. Having 
returned to live with her parents, she would `like to be able to do things more 
spontaneously, have more energy, spend less time with my parents and have more 
self-identity, be stronger and more confident’. She sang and composed, and like 
several others enjoyed clubbing but found the smoky atmosphere a problem. Her 
boyfriend helped her to do her daily chest physiotherapy. Jenny said that she would 
love to be married and have chldren but felt that no one would want to take on the 
responsibility of caring for her and that she was not strong enough to have a child. She 
was unusual among the group in speaking of her pessimism and depression, but like 
all of them she distinguished between problems attributable to CF and problems 
attributable to other factors such as lack of transport and suitable employment. Asked 
what she might say to a woman who has been told that the baby she is expecting has 
CF, Jenny replied, `I would say have the child because I would much rather be alive 
than not, and nowadays treatment is good. Twenty years ago maybe I would have said 
no. A baby now with CF has much better chances than I have.’ Jenny’s family did not 
talk much about her shorter life expectancy. `I’m glad of that and I don’t dwell on 
death and illness. I just get on with doing what I want to do.’  
In contrast, Rob, aged 26, regrets being told `practically since I was born that I might 
die soon. It has stopped me from making plans and getting on with my life, like going 
to university or doing things which might be boring for a few years but lead on to 
something better.’ When asked what he found helpful in his life, Rob talked, like 
several others, about being independent and inter-dependent rather than dependent. 
Asked what he might want to change about himself, again like some of the others Rob 
replied, `I’m happy with my character, I’m very happy with what’s happening in my 
life at the moment,’ and he was more keen to talk about how to change society: `I’d 
rip it up and start again, the materialism and back-biting and callousness. If that was 
sorted out, the smaller issues of tolerance and intolerance would drop into place.’ 
Everyone spoke in many different ways about discrimination and intolerance of 
disability being the main social problems they would change. For example, one man 
with Down’s syndrome described being pushed and shoved in the street by his 
neighbours, and another was fed up with being treated by new work colleagues as if 
he were stupid, though he added, `They learn in the end, and then they realize that are 
the ones who look silly’. 
 
 The ten people with thalassaemia and ten with sickle cell anaemia experienced the 
hidden disability of chronic illness like the CF group. Sometimes they have crises 
which require hospital treatment. They too described a range of rewarding and 
frustrating experiences, enthusiasms and problems. Their conditions did not appear to 
dominate their lives in most cases, and much time was spent talking about the many 
things they had in common with their `ordinary’ peers: work or unemployment, 
income, housing, relationships, leisure activities and ambitions. 
 
The five people with spina bifida showed the lack of correlation between physical 
disability and social fulfilment. Angela, who became upset during the interview and 
cried though she said she wanted to continue talking, was the least physically disabled 
one. In her mid-30s, she worked in a shop, where few of her colleagues knew she had 
any disability. She was actively involved with church and other groups, but said she 
wished that she had more friends and a boy friend. The other more disabled people 
with spina bifida included a young single mother who was also a college student, and 
Richard and Vivian who both used wheel chairs. Richard was a keep fit enthusiast 
who worked at a sports centre and planned to go to Australia to see the paralympics. 
He enjoyed going to city clubs with friends, and could haul himself in his chair up and 
down stairs, so he used underground trains despite officials trying to stop him. He said 
that when he joined mainstream secondary school, the wheelchair users were all 
taught mobility and coping with stairs and pavement kerbs, which helped him to 
become very fit. He said, `I see myself as able-bodied as anyone else.’ 
 
Vivian’s spine was too severely curved for surgical correction to be possible. We sat 
on the floor in her flat and she constantly shifted her weight to relieve her pain. She 
worked in journalism and also gave expert advice about access to public buildings. 
She passionately believed in and worked for disabled people’s rights. Much of 
Vivian’s income went on her transport costs and domestic help. Like Richard she had 
a very busy social life `I’m a great one for socialising. You do feel low and in pain and 
angry with people and it is important to have friends and to go out for a drink.’ and 
she talked enthusiastically about her many interests. Vivian was planning to have a 
baby and she talked of  her mixed feelings about taking folic acid to reduce the risk of 
the baby having spina bifida, yet  `being proud that I have spina bifida’ because it had 
given her such experience, knowledge and opportunities she would not otherwise have 
had.  
 
The forty respondents’ views  on prenatal screening ranged from believing that it was 
very useful, to unhappiness that it was offered to anyone. Those with thalassaemia, 
sickle cell anaemia and CF were more likely favour screening, provided it was 
accurately informed about their condition, which they tended to doubt was the case. 
They also tended to say that they would respect any decision made by prospective 
parents after being properly informed, whether to continue or end a pregnancy 
affected by their condition, though they hoped it would continue and some had mixed 
feelings. One woman with CF said, `CF doesn’t do any good, but people with CF do. 
I’m angry that people assume abortion is advisable for CF or Down’s but I respect the 
right of each person to choose in their own case. I’m not sure that many can make 
informed decisions....It’s difficult, it’s expensive and wasteful to test everyone , and if 
these scary policies come about, what kind of world would it be? Would anyone have 
babies?’  
 
Many spoke eloquently about the dangers and hurt to them of discrimination, and the 
crucial importance of respect for every type of person. These views perhaps led them 
to be non-judgmental of other people, including the prenatal decisions they make. 
However, the people with Down’s syndrome or spina bifida, conditions which are 
most routinely screened for, tended to be more unhappy about screening. For example, 
two men with Down’s syndrome who had been talking intently about their acting, 
suddenly looked very sad when asked about screening, and said they did not want to 
talk about it, as if the subject was too painful. They knew about screening, having 
created plays relating to it.  
 Discussion 
 
The research could be criticized for being too homogeneous about widely diverse 
conditions. However, the interviewees had far more similarities than differences, 
including the ways they reflected on their lives, and their belief that they suffered from 
the general stigma of disability more than from their actual condition. Perhaps these 
interviewees are unusually healthy and capable for people with their conditions.  Yet 
even so, there are probably many other people like them, living as actively as they do 
with their condition. This raises questions about why the prenatal literature, policy 
makers and counsellors make so little mention of the potential range of each condition 
from mild to severe, of the increasingly effective treatments which Jenny mentioned, 
and of the possibility that some therapeutic abortions may prevent potentially 
rewarding lives. A further complication for prenatal predictions is the mismatch, 
shown particularly  by the people with spina bifida, between the degree of severity of 
physical disability and the way people value and enjoy their life. 
 
The implications of the interviews for prenatal counselling and maternal-fetal 
relations 
 
The overall impression given by the interviewees was of very interesting, thoughtful 
and pleasant people. Most of them appeared to value and enjoy their lives, sometimes 
despite pain and serious illness, as much as any average group of 40 young adults 
might say they do. One man with sickle cell anaemia was in such pain that his 
interview took place over three separate visits, but this was because he was so keen to 
take part. Their friends appeared to value them, and so did their families, with one 
exception as might be expected in any group of 40 adults (her mother had died and her 
father had remarried). Most interviewees had far more in common with their 
`ordinary’ peers than differences, and none showed any clear reason why their life 
would have been better prevented.  
 
One woman with CF commented, `I feel up today because I’m talking to you, and I’ll 
feel down on another day.’ Yet she also spoke frankly about her problems and fears, 
as well as about things she enjoyed. Even allowing for the artificial nature of the 
research interview, and the way our methods partly shape the evidence, as is 
inevitable in every type of research, the interviewees provide compelling evidence for 
questioning the assumptions on which prenatal policies and counselling are based: 
that it is reasonable to prevent such lives. The interviewees challenge the view that it 
is kinder to terminate any affected pregnancy, however mildly the fetus might be 
affected, because life is so awful for the severest cases.  
  
 Repeatedly, interviewees spoke of the crucial importance to them of being involved 
in mainstream society - schools and colleges, homes and jobs, clubs and pubs and 
friendships. They tended to find exclusion, rejection and prejudice more painful and 
disabling than the direct effects of their condition. Some saw rejection as a linked, 
indirect effect of their condition, but then another more impaired person would talk of 
overcoming a similar difficulty. They tended to stress their need to see beyond their 
condition as a personal predicament, and to press for greater inclusion by challenging 
negative attitudes in society, and by showing how they could be involved. They were 
grateful to parents who encouraged them to be strong and who, as one woman with 
Down’s syndrome said of her mother, were ready to `fight for my rights [even 
through] the High Court, the High Court of Justice!’  
 
Several interviewees were concerned that prenatal counselling could be seen as 
official medical endorsement of prejudice against them, condoning the restrictions 
they most wanted to see removed from education, employment and their 
neighbourhoods. Some of them helped to train medical students, and they criticised 
inaccurate medical images of disability, such as the sickly child advertisements which 
raise funds for medical research. Our research aim was to listen to and report seldom-
heard voices, and here are some comments made by people with spina bifida.  
 
 `We’re disabled by attitudes and lack of access’ said Vivian.  
 Angela said that `parents should accept their child on any terms.’  
 On prenatal screening, Vivian commented, `You can’t decide for people who 
haven’t had their lives yet....and I’d rather be alive than dead. I’m really proud of 
having spina bifida, it’s not like AIDS or cancer [which her mother had died 
of]....It’s made me make a real effort to do lots of things and to take risks....I don’t 
need to be cured and I don’t want to be anybody else....You can’t just get rid of 
people and go back to the Nazis.’  
 Christel felt that she had become more mature than her friends through becoming 
a mother: `Having a baby wisens you up’.  
 Richard believed, `If you’re old enough to decide you want a child, you should be 
old enough to handle the child, no matter what disability or ability....If [a child] is 
going to have parents that care for it, then I don’t think that it should need 
screening....I think the counselling is partly driven by ignorance.’ If spina bifida is 
diagnosed prenatally, `I would say, “keep the baby, try and make the most of it 
because there are ways round things.’  
 
Richard was referring to a theme that ran through the interviews: of adaptation, 
ingenuity and a resilience that grows through accepting and surmounting difficulties. 
This is in contrast to prenatal screening policies which propose efforts to prevent and 
avoid difficulties, as if human beings cannot or should not have to experience them, 
and as if disability is not inevitable for most human beings, at least at the beginning 
and end of life. The interviewees quoted earlier suggest that this approach is 
unrealistic, because ordinary people’s lives so often involve problems—such as with 
relationships, loss, frustrating limitations or poverty. Fearful avoidance of disability, 
rather than promoting ways to support disabled people’s lives, is liable to diminish 
people rather than freeing them into new achievement and confidence. 
 
The interviewees also worried about future trends, These are vividly illuminated by 
the consultation document on pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, PGD (HFEA, 2000; 
King, 2000), which is considered in the final part of this chapter. PGD involves 
genetic testing of embryos at about the eight-cell stage, after in vitro fertilization 
(IVF) and before selected embryos are implanted into a uterus. The HFEA asks which 
criteria should be used to decide when PGD may be appropriate, such as expectancy 
of a very short life, a life of very poor quality, or one of great suffering. The difficulty 
in these criteria is the current limitations in predicting how severe an impairment 
might be or might become, how much it may be ameliorated by social or medical 
support, and how the affected person and family may experience similar difficulties 
either as much hardship and suffering or as part of a worthwhile rewarding life. Some 
parents value their child’s very short life far more than no life at all (Delight and 
Goodall, 1990). Quality of life fluctuates greatly for many people, and suffering is 
especially hard to gauge in people with severe mental impairments and those who 
appear to be unaware and unable to relate, which are further proposed criteria for 
using PGD. Unawareness may include unawareness of suffering, which would obviate 
the criterion of suffering, and uncertainty again prevails over the diagnosis and 
prognosis of unawareness. Children who have been dismissed as ‘vegetables’ are 
perceived by others to experience profound feelings, such as by the researcher who 
commented, ‘Cabbages do not cry’ (Oswin, 1971). 
 
Apart from difficulties in deciding when to resort to PGD, there are broader concerns 
that PGD adds to the medical and state-funded prenatal screening technologies, in 
appearing to endorse discrimination against impaired people as unwanted burdens 
who are better excluded from society. The argument that prenatal selection is different 
from ending such lives after birth, and affects attitudes towards impaired fetuses only, 
is unconvincing. The interviewees show that some disabled people feel threatened and 
disadvantaged by the prejudices which are, perhaps inadvertently, promoted through 
prenatal screening. The emphasis on particular impairments when selecting an embryo 
or fetus as worth preserving suggests that any policy difference between preserving an 
embryo or a person with, say, thalassaemia is not one of principle but of practicality. 
Abortion is permissible and euthanasia is not, and people with thalassaemia are able 
to assert that their life is worthwhile. Babies and young children are in a vulnerable 
position between fetus and ‘independent viable person’. Rather than justifying the 
view that parents’ attitudes will be unaffected by screening and PGD programmes, 
perhaps it should be the responsibility of those who wish to introduce the programmes 
to guarantee that attitudes are not being affected. Social exclusion, school exclusion 
and family exclusion (in numbers of teenagers living on the streets) are increasing 
rapidly, as are expectations that children should conform to ever more specific 
milestones, school tests and behaviour standards with an unjust ‘zero-tolerance’ which 
does not allow for contingencies and disadvantages. Prenatal programmes are not 
responsible for these changes, but they are part of them, and are powerful medical and 
official indirect endorsements of them. 
 
Another theme of injustice is when public rejection, expressed through national 
prenatal programmes, is made to appear to be a matter of private grief and 
responsibility, as when each individual woman faces the ‘choice’ of termination of 
pregnancy, a choice constrained by social and economic circumstances. Disabled 
activists refuse to accept this way of reducing the political to the personal, in 
individuals’ ‘triumph or tragedy stories’ (Oliver, 1996). Yet pregnant women seldom 
question the way prenatal health professionals tell these stories, and describe certain 
impediments as incompatible with a reasonable life style. For this reason, some 
commentators urge that PGD and similar services should only be offered to affected 
families who specifically request such tests, and not to the general population. They 
are concerned that technological imperatives, free-market economics, and medico-
legal defensiveness will ensure that PGD soon develops into a mass service, as IVF 
comes to be performed more easily and safely. Given a few embryos, tests which 
screen ‘negatively’ for one or a few specific impairments are soon likely to become 
multi-package tests to screen simultaneously for numerous impairments, and then 
tests to select ‘positively’ for growing numbers of preferred features such as 
intelligence of height. ‘Non-directive’ counselling of pregnant women about whether 
to keep a fetus differs from simply informing pre-pregnant women about which fetus 
they might prefer to acquire. The same questions can appear to be far less connected 
with morality or the responsibility of mother to child. Gradually, technology reframes 
and distances moral choices and the most intimate relationships. When the embryo 
and fetus, and implicitly the baby and child, are presented to women by health 
professionals as a means of fulfilling adults’ dreams of perfection, rather than as 
ordinarily imperfect mortals to love as ends in themselves, then maternal-child as well 
as maternal-fetal relationships are likely to become ever more tentative and 
conditional.  
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Table 1.  The 50 interviewees 
 
Conditions  thal-  CF       sickle       spina      
 Down’s  
         assaemia    cell  bifida 
 syndrome 
Interviewees  10  10   10  5  5
  
men      5   2     6  1  4
  
women   5   8     4  4  1  
age range  26-39  17-30   21-33           18-33   20-43  
median age  33  24  29          26  30
  
mainstream  
school   10  9.5   9           4.5   2?
  
special school  -  .5  -  .5  ?
  
college/  
courses    6   4   8  3   5
  
university    4   5(7)   2  1   -
  
 
live with parents   6   3   4  3  2
  
with friend(s)    -   4   1  -  2
  
with partner   1   2   2 . .5  .5
  
have children   1   1   3   1  -
   
live on own   3   1   3  1.5 . 5
   
 
have done paid work 10   9  7   4  3
  
now do paid work  9   4  5  4  -
  
student  -   2  1  2  2  
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